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Abstract: This paper tests the predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem in India after it 
underwent major trade reform in 1991. Using industry level tariff data, the paper empirically 
examines trade liberalization’s effect on the wages of high-skilled labor relative to low skilled 
labor within firms. The study finds empirical evidence to support growing wage differentials 
within firms, which contradict the predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem. Additionally, 
when controlling for firm size and the effects of the global financial crisis, these results remain 
robust. Finally, the paper explores training and welfare and R&D’s effect on the wage 
differentials within firms, finding a direct relationship between training and welfare expenditures 
and executive compensation but no significant impact of R&D expenditure.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In 1776 the “father” of modern economics, Adam Smith, was the first to hypothesize 
about the economic gains from International Trade. In his famous publication, The Wealth of 
Nations, Smith explains that trade occurs on the basis of a countries ability to produce a certain 
amount of a good. Since Smith’s theory of Absolute Advantage, there have been numerous 
models presented by economists to portray the basis in which countries will engage in trade. Each 
subsequent trade theory has been widely accepted and eventually superseded by new models that 
provide more accurate explanations of trade movements between nations. Within this century 
alone, major trade theory has taken several shifts as the leading theoretical models failed to live up 
to their empirical counterparts when predicting the relative wages among skill groups, occupations 
and sectors.  
The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem is the basis for the analysis of International trade used in 
this paper. Using firm level data, this paper tests the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem’s ability to 
explain wage movements across skill groups in India after the country underwent dramatic trade 
reform. The years following India’s market liberalization offers the perfect window to conduct this 
analysis since India’s major economic policy favored protecting domestic markets from foreign 
goods. 
As a low middle income country, India has a relative factor abundance of low-skilled labor, 
and relative scarcity of high-skilled labor relative to the rest of the world. Using OLS, I use tariff 
levels as a proxy for relative openness of an industry in order to analyze market liberalization’s 
effect on the wages of high-skilled labor relative to low-skilled labor. At the firm level, executive 
compensation is used to proxy for the payments given to high-skilled labor, and firm payments 
given to all other non-executive employees represent the payments to low-skilled labor.   
Section 2 gives further theoretical analysis of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem in the 
context of India, a low skill abundant country. Section 3 presents the empirical literature related to 
the trade liberalization and wage inequality. Section 4 provides historical background of India’s 
market liberalization and breakdown of India’s labor markets Section 5 explains the data and 
methodology used in this paper, where Section 6 presents the results and robustness checks of our 
specifications.  Section 7 summarizes and concludes. 
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2. Theoretical Background of Stolper-Samuelson 
 
2.1 Pre-Stolper-Samuelson Trade Theories 
In Smith’s theory of Absolute Advantage, if Country A can produce a larger quantity of 
Good X, using the same amount of resources as Country B, then Country A is said to have the 
absolute advantage in the production of the good. Therefore, Country A and Country B should 
engage in trade of Good X, where Country A will export Good X to Country B.  
 In his 1887 book, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, David Ricardo presents 
his theory of Comparative Advantage, a stark improvement from the theory of Absolute 
Advantage. Ricardo’s model demonstrates that countries should engage in trade on the basis of 
differences in technology or resource endowment. Consider a two country (Country A and B), two 
good (Good X and Y) model, where man-hours are the resource used in the production of both 
goods. Before any trade decision takes place, both countries need to decide how many man-hours 
it wishes to allocate towards the production of Goods X and Y. Each country can either devote all 
of its resources to the production of Good X or Y (or Autarky), or devote a fraction of its 
resources towards production of Good X and the rest to produce Good Y. Since the country is 
aware of the amount of man-hours needed to produce one unit of Good X, and the amount of 
man-hours needed to produce one unit of Good Y, it can trade off man-hours if it wishes to 
produce more of Good X and less of Good Y (and also vice versa). Therefore, the cost of 
producing Good X is thought of in terms of the amount of Good Y it forgoes in order to produce 
one unit of Good X. This is called the opportunity cost, and is the basis for trade between the two 
countries. If Country A has a lower opportunity cost for Good X (in terms of Good Y), relative to 
Country B, then Country A will export Good X to Country B.  
 Ricardo’s theorem of Comparative Advantage was revolutionary at its time, since most 
economists were advocates of Mercantilism, which based International trade on the basis of 
building a trade surplus with other countries. Through specialization and trade, Ricardo’s model 
proves that there is a mutual benefit for countries when they export the goods for which they have 
a comparative advantage, and import the goods that they cannot produce at a lower opportunity 
cost relative to other countries.  
 In the early 1900s, Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin built upon Ricardo’s idea of 
Comparative Advantage, by presenting their neo-classical trade theorem that is based upon each 
country’s difference in relative factor endowments. The Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that a 
country will produce and export goods that makes use of locally abundant factors of production, 
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and will import goods that make use of locally scarce factors. Therefore, if Resource T is more 
abundant in Country A relative to Country B, and Resource T is the primary factor of production 
used in Good X, then it will produce and export Good X to Country B, since it can produce 
Good X at a lower opportunity cost in terms of Resource T than Country B.  
2.1 The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem  
 Taking the Heckscher-Ohlin analysis one step further, Wolfgang Stolper and Paul 
Samuelson enhanced the Heckscher-Ohlin model, by including the of payments given to each 
factor of production in the model – specifically the wages paid to labor and the rent earned on 
capital. In their 1941 paper titled Protection and Real Wages, Stolper and Samuelson base their 
analysis upon the Hecksher-Ohlin model’s idea that a country will export the good that it produces 
with relatively abundant factors, and import the good that relies on relatively scarce factors. As a 
result, this will shift production towards the good that uses the abundant factor, and away from 
the good that uses the scarce factor. Once trade occurs, this should move both countries towards 
an equalization of the factor prices paid to the of production of goods in both countries (i.e. wages 
and rent). However, this movement in factor prices will be partial and will not result in full 
equalization, otherwise there would be no basis for future trade. Nonetheless, after trade if the 
world price of a good is higher than the domestic price of the good, than that country has the 
comparative advantage in the production of the good since they can produce at a lower price 
relative to others.  
  The theoretical basis of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is given by the following model. 
In the model, Country A is a low skill abundant country that is open to trade. It can produce two 
goods, Good X and Good Y. Both goods are produced using two factors of production, high 
skilled (H) and low skilled labor (L). Assume that there is perfect competition in both the goods 
market and the factor markets, and that labor is perfectly mobile across sectors within the country. 
Let Good X be the skill intensive good, while Good Y is the low skill intensive good. Therefore, 
the price of each good is equal to its unit cost, giving the following normal profit condition: 𝑃" = 𝑊%𝐴%" +	𝑊)𝐴)" 𝑃* = 𝑊%𝐴%* +	𝑊)𝐴)* 
Where 𝑃" and 𝑃* are the relative prices of Goods X and Y. 𝑊% and 𝑊) are the wages of the skill 
intensive good and low skill intensive good. 𝐴% and 𝐴)	are the relative levels of skill intensity for 
each good – which is given exogenously in this model. 
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Since the country is abundant in low skilled labor, it will export the low skill intensive good 
(Y) and import the skill intensive good (X). The price of each good is given by the following 
conditions: 
 𝑃" = (1 + 𝑡)𝑃"∗ 𝑃* = 𝑃*∗ 
Where 𝑃" and 𝑃"∗ are the domestic and world price of the skill intensive good, and 𝑃* and 𝑃*∗ are 
the domestic and world price of the low skill intensive good. The tariff level is represented by 𝑡. 
Both the world price and the tariff level are given exogenously in this model.  
In order to graph this relationship in factor price space (Figure 1), we can rearrange the 
above equations to get the following isocost line equations: 𝑊% = 𝑃"𝐴%" − 𝐴)"𝐴%" 𝑊) 𝑊% = 𝑃*𝐴%* − 𝐴)*𝐴%* 𝑊) 
The slope of each isocost line is the negative ratio of skill intensities required to produce each 
good. Therefore, the slope is the cost of one factor of production in terms of the other.  
Figure 1 graphically shows the two isocost lines. The x-axis represents the low skilled wage 
and the y-axis is the high skilled wage. The isocost line for Good X is flatter, since it is skill 
intensive, and thus requires a lower ratio of 123143 to produce Good X (since it is a ratio of low skill 
intensity over high skill intensity). Therefore, the isocost line for Good Y is steeper since its 
production requires a larger share of low skill factors of production.  Since there is positive 
production of both goods, the isocost lines intersect within the factor price space, which gives the 
first equilibrium point in Figure 1. When there is a reduction in the tariff level, the isocost line for 
Good X shifts downwards. This causes our equilibrium high skill wage to decrease, while our low 
skill wage increases. This shift and resulting new equilibrium point of high skilled wages and low 
skilled wages is the theoretical basis of this paper’s hypothesis. From Figure 1, the Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem predicts that the low skill abundant Country A, will see a decline in the wages 
of high skilled labor and an increase in the wages of low skilled labor when there is a reduction in 
tariffs.  
2.3 The Stolper-Theorem in the Context of post-liberalized India 
 In the context of India, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem would lead us to predict an 
increase in the returns to low skilled labor and a decline in the returns to high skilled labor. Given 
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the fact that India is a labor-intensive country, we would expect India to increase its trade of labor-
intensive goods, leading to a rise in the wages of the low skilled labor. From the mechanism 
provided in Section 2.2, we conclude that that wage inequality within exporting firms would 
decrease as the demand for unskilled labor increases. This implies that at the firm level, the wages 
of executives would be stagnant or growing at a slower rate than that of non-executives, since the 
model predicts that the wages of non-executives will be increasing relative to their executive 
counterparts. Despite the model’s predictions, there is a growing number of empirical literature 
that demonstrates contradictory wage movements. The empirical background for the Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem is given in Section 3. 
3. Empirical Literature Review 
 
3.1 Empirical Issues of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem 
 When Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson submitted their theorem to the American 
Economic Review, the paper was praised for its “brilliant theoretical performance”, but was rejected 
due to the fact that it did not “have anything to say about any of the real situations with which 
they theory of International trade has to concern itself” (Davis and Mishra, 2007). There are many 
inherent problems with the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, a few of which will be highlighted below.  
 The first problem involves the goods that are produced by rich countries and poor 
countries within the model. According to Davis and Mishra (2007), there is growing empirical 
evidence that the goods produced domestically in poor countries, “differ systematically in the 
factor input composition, and they differ systematically in quality” from the goods imported from 
rich countries. If such is the case, the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem wrongly treats these goods as 
perfect substitutes for one another. In actuality, these goods might be more accurately depicted as 
noncompeting goods.  
 Another shortcoming of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem is that it is limited in explaining 
the relative wages and movements across skill groups, occupations, and sectors. There is growing 
empirical evidence of increasing wage inequality in both developing and developed countries as 
well as growing wage inequality among workers with similar characteristics and across firms within 
sectors (Helpman et al., 2015).   
3.2 Empirical Literature Review 
In Chiquiar (2008), the author tests the presence of the Stolper-Stamuleson theorem in 
post-liberalized Mexico. He finds that after Mexico joined NAFTA, wages of unskilled workers 
increased in regions that had stronger export ties to the U.S., compared to regions that were less 
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export oriented, which is consistent with the predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. 
Within this context, Chiquiar (2008) demonstrates the existence of spatial differences in the 
effects of trade liberalization. Wage differentials rose within Mexico between states that were 
expert oriented and those that were not, which suggests that workers with similar characteristics 
fared differently in post-liberalization Mexico.  
Amiti & Cameron (2012) take a different approach to empirically testing the Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem. In their analysis, the authors examine the effects of trade liberalization on 
the wage skill premium within firms by examining the input and output tariff levels in Indonesia. 
They define the wage skill premium as high skilled wages divided by low skilled wages, which is a 
measure that is used in this paper. In the authors estimation of the tariff levels effect on the 
wage skill premium, they interact the input tariff level with the firm’s share of intermediate 
inputs, as well as the output tariff level with the firm’s share of exports. By doing so, they predict 
that a reduction in input tariffs will make the production of domestically produced inputs less 
profitable leading to a reallocation of resources away from domestically produced inputs. This 
should reduce the demand for skilled labor, since they show that intermediate inputs are more 
skill-intensive than manufacturing in Indonesia. Therefore, if wages are set at the firm or 
industry level, the authors expect the input tariff level and the interacted term of the input tariff 
level and intermediate import share to have a positive relationship with the wage skill premium. 
With regards to output tariffs effect on the wage skill premium, they interact the output tariff 
level and the export share to identify any impact on exporting firms. The authors find that 
reducing input tariffs reduces the wage skill premium within firms that import their intermediate 
inputs, but do not find significant effects from reducing tariffs on export goods on the wage skill 
premium within firms.  
Goldberg & Pavcnik (2007) provide a discussion on the recent empirical research that 
links globalization to income inequality in developing countries. Their review includes a 
discussion of the benefits and downfalls related to a variety of topics used in this paper, as well 
as a review of the empirical literature surrounding various countries that underwent trade 
liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s. The authors defend potential endogeneity concerns related 
to trade policies and inequality, provide an assessment of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, as 
well as a robust discussions of measurements used to capture trade reform and inequality. The 
authors discussion of these topics have been crucial in forming this paper’s empirical analysis.  
In Topalova (2010) the author studies the impact of trade liberalization on poverty in 
India. Topalova uses variation in sectoral composition across districts and liberalization intensity 
across sectors in a difference-in-difference approach to measure the impact on poverty. The 
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identification strategy used in the paper is as follows: since there were spatial differences in 
industrial composition in India prior to trade liberalization, the drastic reduction in tariff levels 
(which varied by industry, and occurred at different times) caused different spatial exposure to 
trade liberalization across Indian districts. Therefore, the paper establishes whether the changes 
in district-level poverty and consumption before and after trade liberalization is related to the 
reduction of tariffs at the district level. This empirical framework allows the author to measure 
the relative effect of liberalization on districts based off of their trade exposure. Topalova finds 
that average real per capita expenditure in districts where employment was primarily focused in 
industries exposed to larger tariff cuts grew relatively more slowly. This pattern was the most 
robust among the poorest households, while households with larger consumption patterns had a 
lesser and statistically indistinguishable effect from zero.  
Gonzaga et al. (2006) investigates the effect of trade liberalization on skilled labor 
earning differentials in Brazil. The authors look at the relationship between relative tariff changes 
and relative price changes in order to observe the relationship between trade liberalization and 
wage differentials. Their model predicts that the relationship between tariffs and the price of 
goods in each sector will depend on the share of imported goods in each sector. Therefore, 
under the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, this model predicts that trade liberalization will increase 
the relative price of the factor of production that is found in abundance. The authors find that 
the earnings of workers with at least a high-school diploma decreases with respect to earnings of 
less educated workers. Additionally, they show that prices and tariffs are positively correlated, 
but the impact of tariff changes on prices are higher in sectors with larger amounts of imports. 
In Davis (1996), the author provides further theoretical framework that builds upon the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem. In his analysis, the author explains that it is incorrect to analyze 
factor abundance in the global context, but rather factor abundance should be analyzed relative 
to the nearby regions in which one country produces. Therefore, if a country is very labor 
abundant in the global context, but capital abundant relative to its neighbors, then the outcome 
of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem would be the opposite as to what is expected – it will find 
that trade liberalization reduces wages for unskilled labor.  
Using the same database as this study presented in this paper, Ahsan and Mitra (2013) 
investigate the impact of Indian trade reforms on labor’s share in revenue. According to the 
authors, market liberalization will affect labor’s share of revenue by reducing firm-level price-
cost markups as well as the bargaining power of workers. They suggest that these two 
mechanisms will have an ambiguous effect on labor’s share of revenue at the firm level 
depending on the labor intensity of production. In their analysis, they find that in small, labor-
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intensive firms, trade liberalization led to an increase in labor’s share in revenue but a reduction 
in this share for larger, less labor-intensive firms.  
In Verhoogen (2007), the author investigates wage inequality and trade liberalization in 
Mexico, however he takes an approach rooted in firm heterogeneity.  He proposes the quality-
upgrading mechanism, which is a model with heterogeneous plants and quality-differentiated 
goods. In this model, only the most productive firms are able to enter the export market, and are 
able to produce higher quality goods that appeal to consumers in export markets. This allows the 
firm to pay higher wages and attract high skilled workers. This mechanism predicts that inter-
industry wage inequality would grow after market liberalization. Empirically, the authors findings 
support this prediction, giving evidence that larger, more productive plants were more likely to 
increase exports, white-collar wages, blue-collar wages, and production certifications, than 
initially smaller, less productive plants.  
In Helpman et al. (2015) the authors argue that trade-base wage inequality is not a product 
of neoclassical trade theories, but rather firm heterogeneity. The wage inequality theory derived 
from the heterogeneous firm’s specification in Helpman et al. is constructed using mechanisms 
that are derived from firm’s export decisions and human resource hiring practices. In their model, 
there are many sectors and firms that produce differentiated products – or products produced 
within the firm. The purpose of the model is to predict the wages and employment decisions 
across firms within each sector, focusing on the variation across firms and workers within each 
sector (Helpman et al., 2015).  
 The complete model predicts the following two relationships between exporting and firm 
characteristics. The first, the selection effect, states that more productive firms will hire more 
workers, are more likely to export, and pay higher wages. Firms that have higher screening 
efficiency hire workers of greater ability and are more profitable, which allows them to pay higher 
wages and increases their likelihood to export. The second, the market access effect, states that 
exporting leads to higher firm employment and wages. If a firm can access foreign trade markets, 
it will require a larger scale of production, and thus raise the firm’s selectivity of labor. Screening 
costs raise firm’s profitability and increase the firm’s number of matches, but also increases their 
selectivity in the labor market, which reduces employment levels.  
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4. Indian Market Reform & Labor 
 
4.1 Post-Independence Period 
After declaring Independence in 1947, India’s major economic policy was dominated by 
protectionist policies that favored import substitution, complex industrial licensing requirements, 
financial repression, and public ownership of large industries (Cerra & Saxena, 2002). The Indian 
Rupee was not convertible to other currencies and tariff levels were high, preventing an inflow of 
foreign goods. Its macroeconomic policy fostered stability through low monetary growth and 
public sector deficits. As a result, inflation remained low and the current account was in surplus 
for many years until 1980.  
Figure 2 shows the current account balance in India as a percentage of GDP starting in 
1980. In the first half of the 1980s, India’s current account deficit remained relatively low, 
fluctuating just above -2% of its GDP. Although there was a current account deficit, a rise in 
domestic petroleum production allowed savings on energy imports and external inflows of 
financing kept India’s debt servicing manageable (Cerra & Sexena, 2002).   
In the latter half of the 1980s, India’s current account deficit rose sharply due to growing 
expenditures, reaching a high of -2.96% of GDP in 1990. India’s current account deficit exceeded 
the amount of available domestic credit with which it had access to, and was increasingly financed 
through foreign borrowing. Its debt “nearly doubled from some $35 billion at the end of 1984/85 
to $69 billion by the end of 1990/91” (Cerra & Sexana, 2002). With its fiscal and foreign exchange 
sectors in crisis, India underwent major economic reforms to liberalize its trade, financial and 
investment markets (Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2007). Specifically, the government eased industrial and 
import licensing requirements and implemented tariff levels to replace import restrictions which 
led substantial increases in exports (Cerra & Sexana, 2002). The comparison of average tariff levels 
before and after trade liberalization shows a 73 percentage point reduction (Goldberg & Pavcnik, 
2007).  
In regard to wage inequality in India over this time period, during the 1980s India 
experienced an overall increase in the 90-10 log wage differential. After trade liberalization, the 90-
10 log wage differential increased more rapidly than it had during the 1980s, thereby increasing 
overall income inequality (Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2007). Additionally, consumption inequality 
remained relatively stable during the 1980s, experiencing a slight increase over this time period. 
However, after liberalization consumption inequality increased dramatically (Goldberg & Pavcnik, 
2007).  
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4.2 Indian Labor Markets 
 Data from Barro & Lee’s educational attainment dataset is used in this paper to determine 
the relative factor abundance of India’s skill groups. Figure 3 shows the average years of primary, 
secondary, tertiary and total schooling for a sub-sample of countries from 1950 until 2010. These 
countries include Canada, India, Singapore, USA, China, Mexico, South Africa, and the United 
Kingdom. These countries are included to provide a context of Indian educational attainment 
levels relative to a sample of high and medium income countries.  
The first panel in Figure 3 shows the average years of primary schooling for the sample of 
countries. Although the average years of primary schooling have improved in India from about 1 
year in 1950 to above 3 years in 2010, it still severely lags behind the other countries in our sample. 
The second panel shows the average years in secondary school. In 2010, India’s average years of 
secondary school had risen to 2.67 years, which is just above the average years of secondary 
schooling in China. Despite this, compared to the other countries in our sample this is still a low 
level. The next panel shows the average years of tertiary school. Again, in 2010 India is not the 
lowest country in our sample, but relative to the entire group its average years of tertiary schooling 
is still low. The lowest average years of tertiary schooling in our sample is South Africa, which 
averages 0.1 years. Next is China which averages 0.14 years, then India at 0.27 years. The next 
lowest country is Mexico, which averages 0.53 years, nearly double that of India. The final panel in 
Figure 2 shows the average years of total schooling for the sample of countries. In 1950 India has 
the lowest average years of total schooling, and despite making large increases over the years, it 
still has the lowest level of total schooling relative to countries in our sample.  
Figure 3 is used to illustrate the relative abundances of high and low-skilled labor in high 
and middle income countries. Countries with high average years of schooling are classified as 
having an abundance of high skilled labor. Where countries with low average years of schooling 
are classified as having an abundance of low skilled labor. Therefore, Figure 2 indicates that India 
is classified as having an abundance of low skilled labor relative to other high and middle income 
countries. In the context of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, India is relatively abundant in low 
skilled labor and has a relative scarcity in high skilled labor when compared to other high and 
middle income countries.  
Since the basis of this paper is rooted in the relative factor endowments of India, the 
Stolper-Samuelson Theorem predicts that labor will move away from sectors that experience price 
declines, and move towards sectors that experience relative price increases. However, after 
liberalization took place in India, Topalova (2010) demonstrates that there was little evidence of 
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reallocation India. The author contributes this to rigid labor markets, and rather that the 
adjustments to trade liberalization occurred through relative wage adjustments.  
5. Data and Methodology 
 
5.1 Firm Level Data 
 The data used in this paper is taken at the firm level from the Prowess database. It includes 
all publicly traded firms in India and is collected by the Center for Monitoring the Indian 
Economy (CMIE). The firms within the database account for 60 to 70% of total output in the 
organized industrial sector, and 75% of all corporate taxes in India. The data in this paper spans 
from 1997 to 2014 for over 26,000 publicly traded firms. The Prowess database provides 
compensation data that includes salaries, wages, bonuses, and pension contributions for both 
executive and non-executive workers. Using firm level data to evaluate skill levels is advantageous 
since it is readily available throughout our sample period, and since the data provides more robust 
industry classifications than household surveys (Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2007).   
 Wage inequality is used as opposed to consumption inequality for a variety of reasons. The 
first of which being that household data, let alone consumption data is not included in the 
Prowess database. The second is due to the fact that many developing countries do not 
consistently report expenditures in their household surveys (Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2007). 
Additionally, household surveys are often redesigned, so that the wage, income or consumption 
data provided are not easily comparable across years (Goldbeg & Pavcnik, 2007).   
5.2 Tariff Data 
 The data on output tariffs spans the entire sample period (1997-2004) and is taken from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Since the IMF’s tariff data is given using the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule code (HS), which is not included in the Prowess database, each industry’s 
corresponding two-digit HS code was matched by hand to the corresponding industry in the 
Prowess database. Each two-digit tariff level is the average tariff level for a specific industry in a 
given year. A graphical analysis of the tariff level is given in Section 6.1.  
 One challenge that faces the empirical methodology used in this study are endogeneity 
concerns related to the political process involved in reducing tariff levels. Some might argue the 
existence of preferential treatment given to specific industries, brought about by special interest 
groups within an industry hoping to keep protection levels high. Although these concerns are 
genuine, they do not apply to the context of India. The tariff reforms brought about by the Indian 
government were negotiated with the World Trade Organization (Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2007). As 
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a result, industries with initially higher level of protection experienced greater declines in tariff 
levels. Therefore, trade liberalization did not only lower tariff levels, but also restructured the level 
of protection across industries (Topalova, 2010). This pattern suggests that industry lobbies had 
little influence on the magnitude of tariff changes after liberalization.   
5.3 Methodology 
 The estimation strategy of this paper is to use industry variation in tariffs over time to 
identify how reductions in the two-digit industry level tariff level affect three different measures of 
wage shares paid by firms. The baseline results include industry-firm fixed effects in order to 
control for time-invariant firm and industry characteristics, as well as year fixed effects which 
capture economy-wide effects. In addition, the baseline results include location fixed effects to 
control for potential shifts in the relative supply of labor, as well as other shocks across different 
locations in India. Using OLS, the estimation of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem is given by the 
following equation:  ln(𝑋89:) = 	𝛼< + 𝛽> ln(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠89:D>) +𝛽E 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦89: + 𝛽O ln 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙9:+ 𝛽U[𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡89:× ln(𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓9:)] 
where	𝑋89: is a vector of the following dependent variables for company i, industry j, and time t :  
 
𝑋89: 	=
𝑊%𝑊) → 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙	𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚																								 𝑊%𝑊% +𝑊) → 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒	𝑜𝑓	𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠																																			 𝑊)𝑊% +𝑊) → 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒	𝑜𝑓	𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠
 
 
The three different dependent variables are as follows. First is the wage skill premium 
given by Amiti & Cameron (2012). It is calculated as the natural log of total executive 
compensation divided by the total compensation given to non-executive employees. The second 
measure is the executive share of total wages. It is calculated as the natural log of executive wages 
divided by the sum of executive wages and non-executive wages. The third measure is non-
executive share of total wages. Similarly, it is the natural log of non-executive wages divided by the 
sum of executive and non-executive wages.  
 On the right hand side of our baseline equation, the first coefficient (𝛽>) is the natural log 
of total sales for company 𝑖, industry 𝑗, at time 𝑡 − 1. It is deflated using 2010 Indian Rupees. I 
predict that executives will be the primary beneficiaries of increased total sales, and thus expect a 
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positive relationship between total sales and executive compensation. Therefore, I expect 𝛽> > 0 
for the wage skill premium and executive share of total wages, and 𝛽> < 0 for non-executive share 
of total wages.  
The next coefficient (𝛽E) represents a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm 
is an exporter and 0 otherwise. It is taken for company 𝑖, industry 𝑗, and time 𝑡. Rather than 
lagging this variable by one-time period, it is taken in the current period in order to capture the 
exporting effects as they occur. In line with the predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, I 
expect 𝛽E < 0 for the wage skill premium and executive share of total wages, and 𝛽E > 0 for non-
executive share of total wages. That is that exporters will pay higher wages to low skilled labor, 
relative to high skilled labor, since that is the factor that is abundant in India relative to the rest of 
the world.  
Next is 𝛽O which measures the natural log of the average tariff level for industry 𝑗, and 
time 𝑡. This variable is also taken in the current time period since tariff levels are realized by the 
firm when they make their export decisions. Therefore, this coefficient will capture the current 
period effects of trade barrier reduction on compensation structures within firms. I expect that 𝛽O > 0 for the wage skill premium and executive share of total wages, and 𝛽O < 0 for non-
executive share of total wages. Or rather as tariff levels are reduced, executive compensation will 
decrease relative to non-executive share of wages. 
The final independent variable (𝛽U) is an interaction term of the export dummy and tariff 
level. This variable will capture the effect of tariff reductions for exporting firms on executive and 
non-executive share of wages. I expect 𝛽U > 0 for the wage skill premium and executive share of 
total wages, and 𝛽U < 0 for non-executive share of total wages. Again, in line with the Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem, executive compensation for exporters should be decreasing as the tariff level 
is reduced, while the wages paid to non-executives should be increasing as the tariff level is 
reduced, since that is the factor that India is abundant in.  
6. Results: Does Stolper-Samuelson Hold Up? 
 
6.1 Average Tariff Level by Year 
 Figure 4 shows the average tariff level for every industry in our sample over the entire 
sample period. Each point on the graph represents the average tariff level in India for a given 
year. It shows a clear downwards tend, indicating that the average tariff level has gone down 
since 1997. This demonstrates that over the sample period, Indian trade barriers have drastically 
reduced, which is essential for our analysis of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem.  
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6.2 Average Wage Skill Premium by Year 
Figure 5 shows the average wage skill premium in each year for every firm in our sample. 
Each point represents the average wage skill premium for all firms in our sample in a given year. 
From 1999 to 2006, there is substantial growth in the average wage skill premium. It decreases in 
2007 and increases again until 2009, where it begins to decline until the end of our sample. 
Although there are periods where the wage skill premium declines, the overall trend remains 
increasing. Additionally, at the end of our sample the wage skill premium is at a larger share then 
when our sample began. This is an indication that executive compensation grew in relation to 
non-executive compensation over our sample period.  
The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem predicts that in India, as trade barriers continue to 
decline, the wages of non-executives will increase relative to the wages of executives, and hence 
the wage skill premium will decrease over our sample. Since the wage skill premium is increasing 
over our sample period, this is an indication that the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem fails to predict 
wage movements across skill groups. In Section 6.3, we begin our empirical analysis of the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which confirms these results.  
Figure’s 6 and 7 show the wage skill premium for the ten most volatile industries and the 
ten least volatile industries. In Figure 6, we see that the industries where the wage skill premium 
is most volatile experience very large shifts from year to year. It is worthwhile to note that for 7 
of the 10 most volatile industries, there is an increasing trend of the wage skill premium over 
time. In Figure 7 (note the scale of the y-axis is drastically reduced) we see less industries that 
display increases in the wage skill premium over time (4 out of 10).  
Figures 8 shows the industries with the largest wage skill premiums in 1997. Here, we see 
that the distribution is about even between industries that show a decreasing and increasing wage 
skill premium. It is also worth noting that although the largest wage skill premium in 1997 was 
around .6 in the General Machinery industry, many industries saw larger wage skill premiums in 
their industry as time went on. Figure 9 shows the industries with the largest wage skill premium 
in 2014. Here, every industry shows an increasing trend over time, with most industries having 
the wage skill premium in 2014 being the largest wage skill premium over the sample period.  
 
6.3 Empirical Results 
  Table 1 presents the baseline results. In column 1 the wage skill premium is the 
dependent variable. The export dummy coefficient is positive and significant at the 10% level. 
This indicates that on average, exporters experience a 0.303% increase in the wage skill 
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premium. Additionally, the coefficient for the interaction term is negative and significant at the 
5% level. This indicates that for exporting firms, a fall in tariffs is associated with a decline in the 
within-firm wage skill premium.  
 Again in column 2, there is a positive and significant coefficient for the export dummy 
and a negative effect on the interaction term. Both of these results contradict the predictions of 
the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, since the wages of executive’s relative to non-executives is 
increasing for exporters as tariff levels decreased. In order to show evidence of the Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem, these coefficients effect would need to be positive. Since the coefficient 
for the tariff level is positive (although not significant), it becomes clear that globalization has a 
larger and negative effect on the wage skill premium in exporting firms. Column 3 confirms 
these results by showing a negative export dummy coefficient, and positive interaction term 
when non-executives share of wages is the dependent variable.   
 Table 2 shows the same specification as Table 1, however in this specification the sample 
is divided into small and large firms. Within the Prowess database firm population size is broken 
into 10 deciles (the specific number of employees is not given in the dataset). Therefore, small 
firms fall into deciles 1-5, and large firms fall into decile’s 6-10. Additionally, total sales are also 
used to determine the size of firms. Firms that fall below the 25th percentile of our sample’s total 
sales are also considered small firms, where firms above the 75th percentile of total sales are 
classified as large firms. Therefore, a firm must exhibit both characteristics in order to fall into 
the small or large specifications.   
 For large firms, the coefficient for sales is positive and significant at the 1% level in 
columns 1 and 2, indicating that executives are rewarded for increased level of sales relative to 
non-executives. Again in columns 1 and 2, the export dummy coefficient is positive and 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that executives in large, exporting firms demonstrate larger 
wages relative to non-executives. The tariff level coefficient is also positive and significant at the 
10% level for both columns 1 and 2, indicating that reduction in tariff levels are associated with 
increases in executive compensation relative to non-executives for large firms. Finally, the 
coefficient for the interaction term in both columns are negative and significant at the 5% level. 
This confirms the results presented in Table 2, showing that large, exporting firms see an 
increase in executive share of wages relative to non-executives as the tariff level decreases.  
 For small firms, none of the explanatory variables provide significant results for the 
dependent wage share variables. This indicates that firm size plays a large role in determining the 
effects of trade liberalization on wage inequality. A reduction in tariff level causes large firms to 
experience wage movements that contradict the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem.  
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6.4 Robustness Check: R&D and Training and Welfare 
 According to Goldberg & Pavcnik (2007), the current economic literature has been split 
between economists who “favored the trade-openness-based explanations for the increase in the 
skill premium, and those who considered skilled-biased technological change as the primary 
force behind the documented changes in the wage distribution worldwide”. Therefore, the 
following robustness check to our specification uses the interaction of trade openness with skill-
biased technological change to measure its effect on inequality.  
 Wood (1995) who coined the term “defensive innovation” to describe firms’ response to 
trade openness postulated that intensified competition from abroad would induce firms to 
engage in R&D. Therefore, when trade openness is interacted with skill-biased technological 
change, or rather R&D expenditures, the demand for skilled labor should increase. Hence, I 
expect to see an increase in the wage skill premium and the executive share of total wages.  
 Additionally, training and welfare expenditures are also interacted with trade openness in 
order to explore the quality upgrading of firms’ labor supply. This quality upgrading mechanism 
in response to trade openness may arise as firms in import competing sectors try to avoid 
competition by differentiating themselves from their overseas competitors (Goldberg & Pavcnik, 
2007). Therefore, when interacting trade openness and training and welfare expenditures, I 
expect to see a positive effect on the wage skill premium. Or rather, as tariff levels are reduced, 
the quality upgrading mechanism will result in an increase to the wage skill premium.  
 Table 3 explores the interaction of tariff levels with R&D expenditure and training and 
welfare expenditure. For training and welfare expenditure in column 1, there is a negative and 
significant effect at the 1% level on the wage skill premium. In addition, the interaction term of 
training and welfare expenditure and tariff level is negative and significant at the 10% level. 
Interacting this term at the mean training and welfare expenditure level, we see that a 1% 
decrease in the tariff level leads to a 0.117% increase in the wage skill premium. This effect is 
stronger for firms with a larger training and welfare expenditures. For firms with a training and 
welfare expenditure in the 90th percentile, a 1% decrease in the tariff level leads to a 0.207% 
increase in the wage skill premium. These results confirm the predictions of the quality 
upgrading mechanism.  
 In columns 4, 5 and 6 of Table 3, we do not see any significant effect of the interaction 
term on our dependent variables. Therefore, we do not see any evidence of firms engaging in 
R&D as trade barriers are reduced. It is worth noting that the coefficient for the tariff level in 
columns 4 and 5 are negative and significant at the 10% level. Although this provides evidence 
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that confirm the results of the Stolper-Samuleson Theorem, since the sample size has been 
drastically reduced to only 618 firms, they do not hold much weight in our overall specification.  
6.5 Robustness Check: Financial Crisis 
 Another potential concern is that during the global financial crisis, Indian firms 
experienced tighter credit constraints which could affect the results. Although the location-year 
fixed effects would control for the average of these effects, it could be argued that domestic 
firms and exporters could be affected differently. Table 5 shows the effect of trade liberalization 
when the sample is split up into time periods before and after the global financial crisis. Before 
the financial crisis, the interaction term is negative and significant at the 1% level for the wage 
skill premium and executive share of wages. Additionally, it is positive and significant for the 
interaction term in column 3. This confirms our results given in previous specifications of a 
rising wage skill premium for exporting firms.  
 After the financial crisis, the tariff level has a positive and significant effect on the wage 
skill premium and executive share of wages. This indicates that despite tighter credit constraints, 
wage skill premium continued to have an inverse relationship with falling tariff levels.  
7. Conclusions   
  
This paper adds to the growing empirical literature demonstrating that the Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem fails to explain trade liberalizations effect on wage inequality. This study 
contributes to the previous literature by exploring trade liberalizations effect on the wage skill 
premium in India, in addition to its differentiation between executive share of total wages and 
non-executive share of total wages as additional dependent variables. Using firm level and 
industry level tariff data, this paper provides evidence that for exporting firms, reductions to the 
tariff level lead to a rise in the wage skill premium. In addition, this study also shows the 
differentiated effects that tariff reduction has on firm size, and its effect on firms that engage in 
R&D and training and welfare activities. Additionally, the paper shows that these results are 
robust when controlling for the impacts of the global financial crisis. Our results suggest that 
reducing tariff levels produces a large significant within-firm effect on the wage skill premium 
for exporting firms.  
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Figure 1: The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem 
 19 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
Figure 3: Average Years of Schooling in India 
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Figure 4 
 
Figure 5 
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Figure 6: Most Volatile WSP by Industry 
 
Figure 7: Least Volatile WSP by Industry 
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Figure 8: Largest WSP in 1997 by Industry 
 
Figure 9: Largest WSP in 2014 by Industry 
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Table 1: Baseline Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES WSP Executive's Share of Wages Non-Executive's Share of Wages 
    
Sales 0.00819 0.00617 -0.00153 
 (0.00817) (0.00758) (0.00101) 
Export Dummy 0.303** 0.260* -0.0342* 
 (0.149) (0.136) (0.0187) 
Tariff Level 0.0213 0.0204 -0.000837 
 (0.0460) (0.0415) (0.00517) 
Export X Tariff -0.118** -0.102** 0.0124* 
 (0.0547) (0.0499) (0.00658) 
Constant 0.260 -0.183 -0.447*** 
 (0.179) (0.162) (0.0211) 
    
Observations 11,901 11,903 12,114 
R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.008 
Number of Groups 2,604 2,604 2,622 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Location FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.0138 0.0140 0.00764 
    
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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